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German labor market reforms in the 1990s and 2000s are generally be-
lieved to have driven the large increase in the dispersion of current account
balances in the Euro Area. We investigate this hypothesis quantitatively.
We develop a 3-region open economy New Keynesian model with search
and matching frictions from which we derive robust sign restrictions for
wage bargaining and matching efficiency shocks which we term wage mod-
eration shocks. We impose these restrictions on a Global VAR consisting
of Germany and 8 EMU countries to identify a wage moderation shock in
Germany. Our results show that, although the German current account
was significantly affected by wage moderation shocks, their contribution
to European current account imbalances was negligible. We conclude that
the German labor market reforms cannot be the lone driver of European
imbalances.
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1 Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that internal current account imbalances in Europe
were an important factor behind the financial distress experienced by countries
in the Eurozone (see Figure 1).1 What is more controversial, however, is what
the main drivers of these imbalances were. The IMF (2012) and ILO (2012) men-
tion the increase in German competitiveness since the late 1990s as an important
determinant of these imbalances driven by German labor market reforms. Par-
ticularly, the decline in German real wages, relative to the Euro Area partners,
is cited as a key factor. In contrast, other commentators such as Wyplosz (2013)
doubt this view and argue that changes in competitiveness were the consequence
and not the cause of the problem.
We test the contribution of shocks to the German labor market, in the form of
a reduction in workers’ wage bargaining power and/or an increase in matching
efficiency, to Eurozone current account imbalances. We make use of a Global
VAR (GVAR) for 9 EA countries2 in order to measure the spillover effects of
these shocks. We identify these shocks in Germany by deriving minimal sign
restrictions from a 3-region open economy New Keynesian DSGE model with
search and matching frictions. The model features wage bargaining and match-
ing efficiency shocks which we jointly term “wage moderation” shocks. These
restrictions are then imposed on the GVAR (see Eickmeier and Ng (2015)) and
we analyze the response of Eurozone current accounts and quantify the contribu-
tion of these shocks to European imbalances. This identification method follows
Canova and Paustian (2011) and has the advantage of being more agnostic about
the model structure than estimated DSGE models which often requires knowl-
edge of the exact specification of decision rules and are prone to identification
and specification problems. Our approach, in contrast, consists of selecting a
set of robust sign restrictions from the theoretical model which are then used to
identify wage moderation shocks in the structural GVAR, exploiting the flexibil-
ity of the VAR approach. The structural GVAR approach is also best suited for
analyzing shock spillovers within the context of multi-country models.
We show that wage moderation shocks in Germany do generally cause an
improvement of the domestic current account, while foreign responses are het-
erogeneous. However, they account for only a very small fraction of the current
account balance forecast error variances. Counterfactual analysis shows that the
effect of these shocks on the increasing dispersion of the Eurozone current ac-
counts before the crisis is essentially negligible. We conclude that German wage
moderation cannot be the lone driver of European imbalances.
Related literature. While the role of the German wage moderation during the
1See Chen, Milesi-Ferretti, and Tressel (2012) and Hobza and Zeugner (2014) for an overview
of trade and capital flows within the Eurozone.
2We model Austria, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands and
Portugal. Due to a lack of data, we do not model Belgium and Luxembourg.
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Figure 1: Total current account balance as a percentage of GDP for 9 Eurozone
countries (1992Q1-2007Q2)



























late 1990s and early 2000s has been widely discussed by policy institutions (see
IMF (2012) and ILO (2012)), the literature on its international effects is scarcer.
As mentioned above, the IMF and ILO as well as Bundesbank (2011) point out
that the German wage moderation has increased German competitiveness and
thus translated into high current account surpluses, while the current account
balances of many other European countries deteriorated. Similar conclusions are
reached by Sabbatini and Zollino (2010). Vogel (2011) employs a three-region
version of QUEST to investigate possible strategies for re-balancing the Euro
Area. Among other strategies, he investigates the theoretical outcome of wage
moderation. His results indicate that wage moderation should generally help
to re-balance current accounts, as it affects marginal cost of firms, which leads
to competitiveness gains. This is in line with Ivanova (2012) who, using panel
regressions for 60 countries for the 1970-2009 period, finds that countries with
more flexible labor markets tend to have larger current account surpluses.
Gadatsch, Sta¨hler, and Weigert (2014) and Busl and Seymen (2013) make
use of policy simulations within a two-country monetary union DSGE model to
analyze the effect of German labor market reforms on its current account balance
and that of other member states. Their findings are in line with ours as they find a
very limited role for these reforms in driving current account imbalances. There is
also an important literature on the effects of German labor market reforms on the
labor market. Krebs and Scheffel (2013) find that the Hartz IV reform (see below)
led to a lower unemployment rate and a higher job finding rate, which supports
our assumption that the labor market reforms increased matching efficiency. Fahr
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and Sunde (2009) come to the same conclusion by analyzing the Hartz I/II and
III reforms. Closer to our approach, Kollmann, Ratto, Roeger, in’t Veld, and
Vogel (2015) analyze the German current account balance by estimating a three-
region DSGE model for Germany, the Rest of the Euro Area, and the Rest of the
World.3 Their results indicate that the German current account surplus is mainly
driven by shocks to the German savings rate, the rest of the world’s demand
for German exports, and supply shocks associated with labor market reforms.
An estimated DSGE framework allows for the identification of a large number
of structural shocks, which is a clear advantage over our approach. However,
as noted above, standard problems such as parameter identification and the
assumption of knowledge of the exact data generating process (DGP) of the data
often make these estimates fragile. DSGE models also impose more structure on
the data and are hence more prone to model mis-specification problems when
compared to our more agnostic approach. Finally, a three-region model is unable
to trace shock spillovers to specific countries which our GVAR is able to do. Our
approach, hence, differs in that we use the flexibility of the SVAR approach
combined with minimal theoretical restrictions from a multi-country model.
Overall, thus, the evidence is still controversial regarding the effects of the
German labor market reforms on European imbalances through gains in com-
petitiveness and spillover effects on other member states. Our approach focuses
on analyzing the effect of these shocks and remains silent about other possible
sources of these imbalances. However, the use of a GVAR with minimal theory
restrictions provides a more robust data based approach to estimating the dy-
namic effects of shocks without relying on overly restrictive models. This allows
us to assess whether the role of spillovers from German labor market reforms is
quantitatively important.
In the following section, we provide a brief overview of German labor market
reforms that provide the motivation behind investigating the effects of shocks
to workers’ bargaining power and matching efficiency. We then present the 3-
region open economy New Keynesian model with labor market frictions from
which we derive robust sign restrictions. Section 4 explains the GVAR model
and identification strategy. Sections 5 and 6 present the results and counter-
factual analysis, and 7 concludes.
2 German wage moderation policies
During the 1980s and 1990s, the job market in Germany provided high protec-
tion for employees, with prevalence of permanent jobs with dismissal protection,
social insurance, and collective bargaining. Eichorst and Marx (2009) point out
3See also, for instance, Jacob and Peersman (2013) for an estimated two-country DSGE
model to analyze the dynamics of the US trade balance.
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that these conditions led to low labor utilization, which affected the service sector
in particular. Due to the high requirements for firms, labor intensive personal
services, for instance, were mainly provided by family members rather than mar-
ket services.
In 1996, the country was governed by a coalition of the Christian Demo-
cratic Union (CDU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). At the time, rigid
labor markets were attributed a key role in explaining Germany’s poor economic
performance. To increase flexibility, the government started reforming the la-
bor market by increasing the maximum duration of fix-term contracts and the
threshold number of employees which is required to apply for dismissal protec-
tion. Moreover, new minor employment contracts, which have the advantage
of lower non-wage labor costs, became frequently used by firms. Additionally,
collective bargaining became more flexible, as firms could introduce alternative
methods for reducing in working time. With a broader introduction of con-
cession bargaining, firms could dampen wage growth directly (see Eichorst and
Marx (2009) and Jacobi and Kluve (2006)).
During the following recovery period, the Social Democratic Party (SPD)
and the Alliance 9´0/The Greens came to power in 1998. At the beginning of
the legislative period, the coalition reintroduced dismissal protection in 1999 as
well as a restriction on fixed-term contracts to initial hirings in 2001. With the
start of a new recession, however, the government embarked on a new reform to
allow for more flexibility. The package of reforms became known as the ”Agenda
2010”, which also contained the so called “Hartz” labor market reforms. Be-
sides introducing stricter job search monitoring and harsher sanctions such as
reductions in unemployment benefits, the government also reduced the period
of unemployment insurance pay-outs. However, the main force that increased
labor market flexibility was the transition to less bargaining coverage and union-
ization. The share of workers with opening clauses, which allowed for deviations
from the collective contracts, increased strongly. In particular, clauses which
allowed for working-time adjustments as well as reductions in nominal and real
wages became common. According to the IAB Establishment panel from 2005,
almost 29% of firms in West-Germany and 21% of East-German firms had these
opening clauses in their contracts. Among the firms having opening clauses, 52%
had already made use of the new opening clauses by 2005 (see Eichorst and Marx
(2009), Kohaut and Schnabel (2007), and Jacobi and Kluve (2006)).
The effect of these reforms can be seen as a loss in union power and an increase
in labor market flexibility that, as discussed in Krebs and Scheffel (2013), also
led to a higher job finding rate and thus increased matching efficiency. Hence, we
focus on the dynamic transmission of shocks that represent a change in bargaining
power and labor market efficiency. To do so, we rationalize these events using
the DSGE model with labor market frictions we present in the following section
and that we use to impose robust sign restrictions on our structural GVAR.
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3 A New Keynesian open economy model
We now introduce the DSGE model that we use to identify wage moderation
shocks later on in our GVAR model. We follow the lines of Kollmann, Ratto,
Roeger, in’t Veld, and Vogel (2015), Gadatsch, Hauzenberger, and Sta¨hler (2016),
Krause, Lopez-Salido, and Lubik (2008), Ravenna and Walsh (2011) and Cam-
polmi and Faia (2011) to build a 3-region open economy New Keynesian model
with search and matching frictions. The set-up is such that Germany and the
Rest of Euro Area (REA) form a two-country model which is augmented by the
Rest of the World (RoW). The RoW is modelled exogenously. I.e. we allow
feedback effects from the RoW to the Euro Area (EA, including Germany and
REA) but the EA will only affect the RoW through changes in relative prices
affecting the demand for EA products and hence its trade balance. It displays
several standard real and nominal rigidities such as habits in consumption and
price rigidities together with search and matching frictions in the labor market.
Households consume home produced and imported goods from the other two
countries, and can hold home and foreign bonds. For simplicity, and following
Kollmann, Ratto, Roeger, in’t Veld, and Vogel (2015), we assume that foreign
debt is all denominated in the RoW currency. The interest rate on bonds is debt-
elastic, allowing us to introduce a risk premium both within the EA and between
the EA countries and the RoW. There are preference, labor supply, productivity,
wage bargaining, matching efficiency, and monetary policy shocks.
Since the Germany and the REA are both symmetric large open economies,
we use the superscript k = {GER,REA} when explaining the model to denote
equations that are replicated for both countries. In the parts where it is necessary
for intuition, we will re-introduce the specific country superscript. As Germany’s
exchange rate regime with the REA changed throughout the period considered,
we present two versions of the model to check whether the sign restrictions are
robust the monetary regime change. The first version is for the case of flexible
nominal exchange rates and the second for the case of a monetary union. The
following sub-sections explain the GER and REA blocks of the model. The RoW
will be presented afterwards.
3.1 Labor market: search and matching
Firms fill open positions with identical workers by publishing adverts and screen-















t the shares of searching workers
and vacant positions. m¯kt is the stochastic efficiency of the matching function
that follows the law of motion: log(m¯kt ) = (1 − ρ
m)log(m¯k,SS) + ρmlog(m¯kt−1) +
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ǫmt , where ǫ
m
t a shock to matching efficiency. ν, with 0 < ν < 1, stands for








, which is decreasing in labor market tightness θkt =
V kt
Skt
and increasing in matching efficiency. Thus, a positive shock to matching
efficiency increases the probability of firms filling vacancies for a given labor
market tightness. We will later use this shock as one of the two consequences of
the German labor market reforms. The law of motion for aggregate employment
is given by













where ρ is the exogenous job separation rate. The number of searching workers
is thus given by
Skt = 1− (1− ρ)N
k
t−1. (3)




which is increasing in labor market tightness. The unemployment rate is defined




Each household in country k is a continuum of workers that is distributed over




















where β denotes the discount factor, Ckt is the composite consumption aggre-
gator, ωCkt−1 an index of external habits, N
k
t is labor, H
k
t hours worked, σ the





are preference and labor supply shocks respectively
that affect the discount factor and the dis-utility of work. We assume that both
shocks follow an AR(1) process with persistence ρL and ρP respectively. The





























+ T kt (5)
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as well as









Here, P kt denotes the aggregate price level, D
k
t domestic bond holdings, B
k
F,t
denotes holdings of country k’s bonds by foreigners (that is RoW and the other
country in the EA), ekRoW,t the nominal exchange
4 rate defined as units of domestic
currency per unit of foreign currency, Rkt the domestic interest rate, R
RoW
t the
foreign (RoW) interest rate, W kt real wages, b
k unemployment benefits of the
Ukt = (1 − N
k
t ) unemployed household members, Π
k
t profits from the firms and
T kt transfers or lump sum taxes.
Households consume home and foreign produced differentiated varieties. Each




























where ǫ > 1 stands for the home and foreign elasticities of substitution between























RoW,t denote home consumption of German, REA and
RoW goods, respectively. ̟ stands for the Armington elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign goods. Coefficients nkk can be interpreted as the degree
of home bias in consumption. nGERREA, for example, refers to the share of REA
goods in the German consumption basket when relative prices equal unity.5 The
consumption index is thus a generalized mean of consumption of home goods
and foreign goods with the weights given by n.
With symmetric equilibrium, households choose domestic and foreign trad-
able goods to minimize expenditure leading to the following static demand func-






. As mentioned above, we also assume
that international debt is issued in the RoW currency for simplicity.












































































































































(1 +RRoWt )β. (20)















As suggested by Kollmann (2002) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), we in-
troduce XGERRoW,t and X
REA
RoW,t as foreign debt elastic interest rate premium to ensure
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where γ is the debt-elasticity of the risk premium. Combining the FOCs for Dkt











Firms operate in monopolisticaly competitive markets as they produce differen-
tiated goods and produce using only labor with a diminishing returns production
function:








where υ governs the degree of diminishing returns to labor and At a technology







Firms can sell their output for consumption at home or abroad. We assume
producer currency pricing and account for price stickiness by assuming that firms
are subject to quadratic price adjustment costs a` la Rotemberg (1982). Firms
maximize real discounted future profits:



































where ψ is the price adjustment cost coefficient. Since firms take only domestic
6This UIP condition for each country k with the RoW implicitly defines a UIP condition
for countries within the EA.
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, which can be
interpreted as a proxy for the terms of trade (see Campolmi and Faia (2011)).
Hence, the stochastic discount factor discounts future profits taking only domes-
tic prices into account. It provides today’s (period t=0) value of future profits
in terms of marginal utility of consumption adjusted by home prices. Parameter
κ denotes the hiring costs, while world consumption of the home good is given















k = REA. Firms maximize (17) subject to the law of motion for employment




























t (i). We interpret
the Lagrange multiplier of (29) as marginal costs (mckt ) and the multiplier related




























































































































Firms and workers negotiate wages according to a Nash bargaining process, such





















denotes the households’ marginal utility of supplying an additional





denotes the firms’ marginal utility of hiring an
additional unit of labor. The parameter ηkt can be interpreted as the bargaining
power of households.








0 ≤ ηkt ≤ 1. This, together with the matching efficiency shock, is one of the
key shocks we will be focusing on. A negative shock to ηt gives the households’
marginal utility of supplying an additional unit of labor a lower weight in the
Nash bargaining problem, which is equivalent to a lower bargaining power of
labor unions. As discussed above, in Germany, this happened mainly through a
shift from collective bargaining to concession bargaining and the introduction of
opening clauses (see Section (2)).
















































































































































The goods market clearing condition is given by
















Y GERt , (42)
and
















Y REAt . (43)
Production is used in consumption of home and foreign goods, spending on
vacancy costs, and the cost of the quadratic price adjustment.
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3.6 The current account and the real exchange rate
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As mentioned above, we assume that the law of one price (LOP) holds and
that the Euro Area is too small to affect prices in the rest of the world, which
are therefore exogenously determined. We define the German real exchange rate













which implies that an increase in Qt is a (German) depreciation.
3.7 Monetary and fiscal policies


















where the superscript SS denotes the steady state value of a variable. The cen-
tral bank targets the deviations of inflation and output from their steady states
according to the policy weights τ kπ and τ
k
y . Moreover, the monetary authorities
smooth the law of motion of the nominal interest rate according to the smoothing




is a monetary policy shock.







k + T kt , (51)
implying that the government finances spending on unemployment benefits and
net transfers by issuing bonds domestically.
3.8 The foreign economy
Since we treat the Euro Area as small economy, we model the RoW as a set of
exogenous processes. The deviation of consumption from its’ steady state follows















t denotes a shock to foreign consumption and 0 < ρCRoW < 1. The
allocation of consumption between Germany and the REA, however, will depend
























Inflation is defined as πRoWt =
PRoWt
PRoWt−1
, which is also assumed to follow an AR(1)















t denotes an error term. We assume that the foreign monetary au-





















t is a foreign monetary policy shock.
Finally, we assume that
Y RoWt = C
RoW
t . (58)
3.9 The case of a currency union
We now consider the currency union version of the model to account for the
establishment of the EMU in 1999. We use this version to ensure that our sign
restrictions to identify the wage moderation shocks hold under both a flexible
exchange rate regime and a monetary union.
Our EMU model differs from the previous one in the way that the nominal
exchange rate between GER and REA is normalized to 1 (i.e. all countries share
the same currency) and that there is a single Euro Area central bank setting the
nominal interest rate REAt according to the union wide inflation and output gap.































However, the intra-regional interest rates are foreign debt elastic, meaning
that interest rates across the region may differ according to their positions in net
foreign assets. Consequently, as a net borrower (lender), the nominal interest













































3.10 Calibration and derivation of sign restrictions
We follow the procedure outlined in Canova and Paustian (2011) to derive sign
restrictions. The procedure seriously takes into account parameter uncertainty
in order to derive responses whose signs can then be imposed as restrictions on
the VAR. First, we define a reasonable space for each parameter. Second, we
randomly draw from the parameter space 10,000 times and obtain impulse re-
sponses for each draw. We use a uniform distribution for the parameter space so
we do not impose any strong prior about the value of parameters. Third, we col-
lect the generated impulse responses and observe the signs as well as the periods
over which the shocks produce positive or negative responses. This information
then enables us to derive sign restrictions that are robust to parameter choice in
terms of signs.
Table (1) shows the range of values considered for every parameter. The pa-
rameters n are set in such a way that they cover a wide range of different weights.
The discount factor β is set to 0.99, which corresponds to an annual interest rate
of 4%. The literature generally considers bargaining power parameters between
0.5 and 0.7 (see Weber (2000)). However, we also want to consider the case of
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lower bargaining power of households and let η therefore vary between 0.3 and
0.7. The debt elasticity is fixed to 0.01, which implies that an increase in the net
foreign asset position by 10% translates into a decline in the borrowing rate by
0.1%.7 The degree of risk aversion ranges from 1 (log utility) to 2.5, which corre-
sponds to an elasticity of substitution in consumption of 0.4. Hence, we consider
a wide range of estimates by Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). The elasticity of labor
supply ranges between 1 and 4, implying a Frisch elasticity between 0.25 and
1. These values are supported by Smets and Wouters (2007), Cho and Cooley
(1994), and Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011). We allow the price stick-
iness parameter to vary between values used in Campolmi and Faia (2011) (20)
and Krause, Lopez-Salido, and Lubik (2008) (100), which are in the lower and
upper range of the literature. Moreover, the habit persistence coefficient takes
values between 0.5 and 0.9, which are common in the literature (for example see
Smets and Wouters (2007)). With steady state matching efficiency parameter
values between 0.5 and 0.9, we cover the main range of estimates (see Pissarides
and Petrongolo (2001) for a survey). Elasticities of demand between 5 and 8
imply mark-up ratios of prices over marginal costs between 1.14 and 1.25. This
is in line with the estimates in Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat (2003). We rely on
vacancy costs between 0.05 and 0.15 (see for example Krause, Lopez-Salido, and
Lubik (2008) and Yashiv (2000)). The parameter space for the separation rate
is based on estimates by Hobijn and Sahin (2009). Pissarides and Petrongolo
(2001) show that estimates for matching efficiency generally vary between 0.5
and 0.8. According to estimates for the vacancy duration by ECB (2002) and
Weber (2000), we take the probability of finding a worker between 0.4 and 0.8.
With values for υ between 0.5 and 1, we allow for constant and diminishing re-
turns of labor. Additionally, we consider values between 1 and 3 for the elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign goods, which is in line with estimates
by Feenstra, Luck, Obstfeld, and Russ (2014). The ranges for the Taylor rule
parameters relate to estimates by Orphanides (2001).8
For the autoregressive parameters of shocks, we set values between 0.5 and
0.9 for preference, labor supply, foreign output gap, and foreign inflation gaps.
The technology shock is allowed to vary between 0.5 and 0.99, i.e. an almost
permanent shock on the upper bound. The two shocks of interest to us are the
wage bargaining and matching efficiency shocks. Because reforms appear to have
been permanent, at least for the observed sample period, these shocks could be
thought of as non-stationary. However, bargaining power is bounded between 0
and 1. For this reason, we allow these shocks to be highly persistent with an
7Changing the debt elasticity only affects the persistence of the current account. Results,
available on request, show that changing this parameter has no consequence for the identifica-
tion of shocks.
8We also vary the weights of countries in the consumption aggregator so that we allow for
varying degrees of consumption home bias. This is done such that, on average, the REA is
larger than Germany. The combination of parameters allows for home and foreign bias in
consumption.
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Table 1: Parameter uncertainty
Parameter Name Range
nGERGER share of GER [0.05, 0.3]
nGERREA share of REA [0.3, 0.69]





β discount factor [1.04−0.25]
η bargaining power of households [0.3, 0.7]
γ debt elasticity 0.01
σ risk aversion [1, 2.5]
ϕ elast. of labor supply [1, 4]
ψ price stickiness [20, 100]
ω habits [0.5, 0.9]
m¯ steady state matching efficiency [0.5, 0.9]
ǫ elast. of demand [5, 8]
κ vacancy costs [0.05, 0.15]
ρ separation rate [0.05, 0.1]
ν elasticity matching function [0.5, 0.8]
q(θt) probability of finding a worker [0.4, 0.8]
υ labor share [0.5, 1]
µ elast. of sub. between (H) and (F) goods (1, 3]
ρa technology shock (AR coef.) [0.5, 0.99]
ρη bargaining power shock (AR coef.) [0.5, 0.99]
ρm matching efficiency shock (AR coef.) [0.5, 0.99]
ρP preference shock (AR coef.) [0.5, 0.9]
ρL labor supply shock (AR coef.) [0.5, 0.9]
ρc∗ foreign output gap (AR coef.) [0.5, 0.9]
ρπ∗ foreign inflation (AR coef.) [0.5, 0.9]
τr interest rate smoothing [0.5, 0.9]
τy output gap coef. [0.1, 0.5]
τπ inflation coef. [1.25, 2.5]
autoregressive parameter of up to 0.99. For finite sample periods, the effect of
permanent shocks would be equivalent. We carry out two experiments. In the
first, we allow these parameters to vary between 0.5 and 0.99. In the second, we
fix these two shocks to have a persistence of 0.99.9
Figures (2) to (5) display the 10% to 90% range of impulse responses for
the 10,000 draws following a negative 1 SD shock to the bargaining power of
households (i.e. a positive shock to the bargaining power of firms) as well as
9Reassuringly, fixing the persistence of the labor market shocks to 0.99 and the rest of
the parameters to their mid-range, the simulated data for the current account in the model
displayed an autoregressive persistence of 0.993. Hence, the model is able to generate near
non-stationary current account dynamics as those observed in the data.
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to the matching efficiency for both the pre-EMU and EMU model respectively.
The figures correspond to the experiment where ρη and ρm vary between 0.5
and 0.99. The rest of the impulse responses and those which correspond to the
second experiment are reported in Appendix D.
Figure 2: Shock to bargaining power under parameter uncertainty (pre-EMU)




















































Note: 10% to 90% range of impulse responses for the 10,000 draws.
Overall, we find that the shocks to bargaining power lead to a decline in real
wages and marginal costs, which translates into a lower inflation rate. Firms
produce more output and demand more labor, which causes a decline in the
unemployment rate. In the pre-EMU model, the nominal interest rate falls ac-
cording to the Taylor rule, since more flexible labor markets reduce inflationary
pressure. Matching efficiency shocks have similar effects on the dynamics of the
endogenous variables, as they increase the probability of finding a match for firms
and workers, reducing marginal costs. In the EMU model, because the central
bank reacts to area-wide inflation, it reduces interest rates by less than in the
pre-EMU model. The interest rate also falls because it is foreign debt elastic.
The higher net foreign asset position reduces the debt elastic risk premium and
thus the interest rate. Since UIP and LOP hold, the nominal exchange rate
appreciates. The real exchange rate, however, can appreciate or depreciate de-
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Figure 3: Matching efficiency shock under parameter uncertainty (pre-EMU
model)
















































Note: The shaded area denotes the 10% to 90% range of impulse re-
sponses for the 10,000 draws.
pending on the home bias coefficient in consumption. With a high home bias,
the fall in relative home prices leads to a depreciation of the real exchange rate.
If home bias is low, because foreign prices have increased relative to home, the
effect of the nominal exchange rate appreciation dominates. Results are similar
if the autoregressive coefficients ρη = ρm = 0.99 are fixed. The only exception is
the response of output, which is negative on impact, but positive in the following
quarters (see Figures (20) - (23) in Appendix D).
The robust responses obtained from the simulation of the model with param-
eter uncertainty then provide us with a method to identify shocks in the GVAR.
This is a more agnostic way of identifying shocks than imposing the strong struc-
ture of a DSGE model on the data. The GVAR contains data on output (y),
20
Figure 4: Shock to bargaining power under parameter uncertainty (EMU)





















































Note: 10% to 90% range of impulse responses for the 10,000 draws.
interest rates (r), real wages (wp), inflation (Dp), unemployment rate (u), real
exchange rate (reer), and the current account balance as a percentage of GDP
(ca). Thus, we look at the robust impulse-response signs obtained from the
model for these variables. We do not, however, use restrictions on ca since the
reaction of this variable in the GVAR is our object of study and we do not want
to restrict its behavior by assumption. We summarize the information in Tables
(2) and (3). The tables show the signs of the impulse responses on impact for
the pre-EMU and the EMU models. A “?” symbol denotes that the response
is not robustly positive or negative, and framed values indicate the variables on
which we imposed sign restrictions in the GVAR.
As shocks to bargaining power and matching efficiency yield responses which
are qualitatively similar, we interpret a shock which simultaneously increases
output and reduces real wages, inflation, and unemployment as a wage mod-
eration shock. This is consistent with the pre-EMU the EMU models. Given
that the response of output can be negative on impact if ρη = ρm = 0.99 (see
Figures 20 - 23), we impose a positive restriction on the response of output for
the quarters 1-4 following the shock. Additionally, we impose restrictions on
inflation inflation (-), real wages (-) and the unemployment rate over lags 0-4 on
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Figure 5: Matching efficiency shock under parameter uncertainty (EMU)
















































Note: The shaded area denotes the 10% to 90% range of impulse re-
sponses for the 10,000 draws.
the impulse response functions of the German model in the GVAR.
Given the fast reversion of inflation following the shock in the EMU model,
we set the restriction on inflation only over the lags 0-1. Specifically, all sign
restrictions must satisfy the condition >= 0 and <= 0 (see Table 4).
4 The GVAR model
The GVAR model, introduced in the literature by Pesaran, Schuermann, and
Weiner (2004), links country-specific VAR models using appropriate weights that
allow tracing a country-specific shock into foreign economies. This is especially
well suited to our purpose as we want to analyze the effect of a shock to the
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Table 2: Signs of the impact response intervals to different shocks (Pre EMU
model)
Y R W Q π U CA
Technology + - - ? - + +
Bargaining power + - - ? - - ?
Matching efficiency + - - ? - - +
Preference ? + + ? + - -
Monetary policy + - + ? + - +
Labor supply + - - ? - + +
Note: The frames denote the restricted variables.
Table 3: Signs of the impact response intervals to different shocks (EMU model)
Y R W Q π U CA
Technology + - - ? - + +
Bargaining power + - - ? - - +
Matching efficiency + - - ? - - +
Preference ? + + ? + - -
Monetary policy + - + ? + - +
Labor supply + - - ? - + +
Note: The frames denote the restricted variables.






Note: The table shows the theoretical sign restrictions, de-
rived from the 3-region DSGE model.
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German labor market on the current account of other EMU members.
4.1 Model set-up
We estimate a GVAR model covering a set of 9 EMU countries using a sample
of 61 observations ranging from 1992Q1 to 2007Q2.10 We consider the log levels
of all variables involved (except for the current account and inflation).11
The variables entering the VAR for each economy i = 1, . . . , 9 are real GDP
(y), inflation rate (Dp), real wage (rw), unemployment rate (u), real effective
exchange rate (reer), and the current account balance as ratio of GDP (ca). The
interest rate (r) enters as an endogenous variable for Germany but exogenous
for the rest of the countries. Table 5 presents the variable names and the corre-
sponding data transformations. Note here that, for the empirical counterpart of
the real exchange rate (reer), the definition is such that an increase corresponds
to an appreciation. Details on data construction can be found in Appendix A.
Table 5: Variables entering the VAR and their transformations
Variable Name Transformation
Real GDP y ln(RGDPt)
Inflation Rate Dp ∆ln(CPIt)
Real Wage wp ln(Compens. per empl./CPIt)
Unemployment Rate u ln(Unemployment Ratet.)
REER reer ln(REERt)
Current Account Balance ca CAt/NGDPt
Interest Rate r 0.25 ∗ ln(1 +Rt/100)
Table 6 presents detail about how different variables enter the model. Vari-
ables with a superscript ∗ are foreign trade-weighted variables as we will discuss
below. Variables xit represent the endogenous variables for each country model
and x∗it represent variables that enter exogenously. All variables, except the in-
terest rate, are treated as endogenous in all country models. Since the German
Mark served as anchor currency for the European Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM), Germany plays the dominant role in our model. Thus, we employ the
German interest rate as an endogenous variable in the German model, but as an
10The sample is chosen such that estimates are not subject to the potential biases arising
from the German reunification or the 2008 financial crisis. The build up of the European
imbalances occurred during this period. The financial crisis, however, led to the appearance
of significant country-specific and global risk and partial current account re-balancing. This
would require the consideration of a model that explicitly accounts for these factors and, thus,
modelling the crisis period would be beyond the scope of this paper.
11For model estimation we use a modified version of the GVAR Toolbox by Smith and Galesi
(2011).
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exogenous in all other country models.12 Note that the index “2” in the interest
rate row refers to the second country in our model, which is Germany.




























Real Effective Exchange Rate reerit - reerit -
Current Account Balance cait - cait -
Interest Rate r2t - - r2t
Table 7: Trade Weight Matrix
Country aut deu esp fin fra gre ita nld prt
aut 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.01
deu 0.68 0.00 0.27 0.45 0.40 0.31 0.37 0.55 0.22
esp 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.19 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.45
fin 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01
fra 0.07 0.27 0.32 0.12 0.00 0.14 0.27 0.19 0.17
gre 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00
ita 0.14 0.19 0.17 0.11 0.20 0.29 0.00 0.11 0.08
nld 0.05 0.22 0.08 0.19 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.07
prt 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00
We employ fixed trade weights (reported in Table 7) for the construction of
foreign variables.13 The weights (ωij) represent the average total trade between
country i and j relative to the total trade of country i with all countries in
12We also tested a specification with a dominant unit as described by Chudik and Pesaran
(2013). We let the interest rate be exogenous in all countries. In the single-equation dominant
unit model the nominal interest rate is regressed on its own lag as well as lags of PPP-GDP
weighted aggregates of output and inflation. This specification is similar to a mixed cross-
section GVAR that models the ECB policy rule explicitly (see Georgiadis (2015)). The results
were similar to those obtained from the benchmark model.
13We also estimated the model with two other alternative weight matrices derived from
the IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey. We used the total portfolio investment
asset positions of equity and debt instruments. As Eickmeier and Ng (2015), we reversed the
direction of assignment by country in order to get matrices for outward and inward portfolio
investment. The different weights (averages over the years 2004-2007) had only a very limited
effect on our results. FDI and banking claims data are not available for our sample period.
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the sample over the years 1992 to 2007. Foreign variables (except the nominal



















We now describe the specification and identification method used for the
GVAR estimates.
4.2 The single-country models
Due to the small sample size, each economy i is represented by the VARX*(1,1)
model




i,t−1 + uit, (69)
where xit denotes the vector of domestic variables and x
∗
it the vector of foreign
exogenous variables. ai0 and ai1 are column vectors of ki× 1 dimension denoting
coefficients of constants and time trends, respectively. The coefficient matricies
Φil and Λil are of ki× ki dimension. uit is a ki× 1 vector and assumed to be IID
with zero mean and covariance matrix Σii.
After further transformations, we get
Ai0zit = ai0 + ai1t+ Ai1zit−1 + uit, (70)
where
zit = (xit, x
∗
it)
′, Ai0 = (Iki ,−Λi0), Ai1 = (Φi1,Λi1).









where Wi denotes a weight matrix. It follows that
Ai0Wixt = ai0 + ai1t+ Ai1Wixt−1 + ut. (71)
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By stacking all models, we obtain













































Premultiplying (72) by G0 yields




0 b0, f1 = G
−1
0 b1, F1 = G
−1
0 G1, ǫt = G
−1
0 ct.
The final equation (73) represents our GVAR model, which we obtain from the
estimated single country models.
4.3 Shock identification
We apply our agnostic sign restriction approach, as proposed by Eickmeier and
Ng (2015), in order to identify the wage moderation shock in Germany.14 The
advantage of this procedure is that identified shocks are not correlated within
countries and only weakly correlated across countries. This enables us to inter-
pret a particular shock as country-specific.
We impose sign restrictions using the algorithms outlined in Rubio-Ramirez,
14The literature on sign restrictions was initiated by Faust (1998), Canova and Nicolo (2002)
and Uhlig (2005).
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Waggoner, and Zha (2011) and Fry and Pagan (2007). Given the residuals from
each estimated country i model, we compute lower triangular Cholesky matrices











. . . 0




which gives us the impulse responses ψh = φhG−10 P , where φ
h denotes the hth
matrix of the vector moving average representation of the GVAR having a K ×
K dimension. We draw random k2 × k2 orthonormal matrices
15 and perform
QR-decompositions, which provide unique matrices (Q2) that satisfy Q2Q
′
2 =






′), which satisfy our sign restrictions. Since inflation reverts faster than
other variables, we impose the restriction on inflation only over the quarters 0-1.
The restriction for output, as discussed above, holds for periods 1 to 4, whereas
other restrictions must hold for quarters 0-4. Since we identify only one shock in
a country with 7 variables, we also impose restrictions on the other variables to
ensure that the identified shock only appears in the first equation. This strategy
enables us to circumvent the multiple shocks problem discussed by Fry and Pagan
(2007). The design of the P matrix, however, requires the assumption that there
is no correlation between the shocks across countries. Within the GVAR, this
is accounted for by matrix G0, which captures the contemporaneous spillovers
across countries.
The 1,000 draws obtained produce impulse responses which satisfy our sign
restrictions according to Tables 2 and 3. However, not all draws are necessarily
related to the same data generating process (DGP). Reporting measures like
certain percentiles from the distribution of these impulse responses as confidence
bands may thus be a malpractice (see Fry and Pagan (2007)). Following Fry and
Pagan (2007), we deal with the multiple model problem by selecting the model
which produces the impulse responses having the smallest total deviation from
the medians of all impulse responses. In the case of the GVAR, we only take
German variables into account, because we are focusing on a country-specific
shock. The rest of our analysis proceeds by discussing the bootstrap (of 1,000
draws) of this median target model. We are thus able to identify a country-
specific shock in Germany and the GVAR model enables us to trace this shock
into foreign countries and to quantify its effect on foreign variables.
15The index 2 refers to country 2, which is Germany (k2 = 7).
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5 Results
We now discuss the impulse responses following a wage moderation shock in
Germany and analyze the importance of the shock as a driver of current ac-
count balances by decomposing its forecast error variance. As discussed earlier,
the model generates stationary but highly persistent current account dynamics.
Although for the finite sample period we have in the data this is observation-
ally equivalent to non-stationarity, the current account cannot be asymptotically
non-stationary. Therefore, we should expect that a wage moderation shock in
Germany led to highly persistent but stationary effects on EMU current accounts.
This is why, along the same lines as Kollmann, Ratto, Roeger, in’t Veld, and Vo-
gel (2015), we proceed by considering a shock with transitory but potentially
highly persistent effects on the current account.
5.1 A German wage moderation shock
In Figure (6), we report the German impulse responses following a 1 standard
deviation wage moderation shock. The light blue area represents the 90% confi-
dence bands, the dark blue area the 68% confidence bands and the red line the
median. Following a negative one standard deviation wage moderation shock,
real wages, inflation and the unemployment rate fall by definition, while output
improves. It is noticeable that the shock generates a very persistent response of
the current account. The median response takes about 40 quarters to settle back
to equilibrium. Output, the real exchange rate, and unemployment also display
highly persistent responses.
We find that the interest rate increases slightly by approximately 0.01%. This
results from the large and persistent output increase following the shock while
inflation falls only by a small amount and quickly returns to equilibrium within
a quarter. The real effective exchange rate appreciates by 0.4%. The appreci-
ation following a supply shock is a common finding in the literature and often
referred to as perverse supply side effect. Farrant and Peersman (2006), for ex-
ample, find this effect for the Euro Area. Note, however, that this response is
not inconsistent with the model, which can generate both positive and negative
responses. Importantly, and in line with the DSGE model, we find a very sig-
nificant improvement of the German current account balance by about 0.13%.
Following Canova and Paustian (2011), we analyze the difference between
the impulse responses derived directly from the rotation matrices and the Fry
and Pagan (2007) median target model. We report all the impulse responses
computed using the 1,000 accepted rotation matrices in Figure 7. The impulse
response functions of the Fry and Pagan (2007) median target model are colored
red. The Figure indicates that the difference between both approaches is very
small. However, a comparison of both procedures is difficult, because they mea-
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Figure 6: Impulse responses of a German wage moderation shock on German
variables (in %). The light blue area represents the 90% confidence bands, the
dark blue area the 68% confidence bands, and the red line the median.
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sure very different objects. The distribution of impulse responses derived from
the rotation matrices is closer to a measure of model uncertainty. The Fry and
Pagan (2007) approach, on the other hand, is a measure of estimation uncer-
tainty as it involves a bootstrap (re-sampling of residuals) of the target model.
We observe that the results for the REER and the interest rate vary, meaning
that the results of the median target model may not necessarily be significant
when considering all possible models. However, the current account response is
robustly positive after two quarters.
We now look at the response of the current accounts of the other countries
following the German labor market shock. Figure 8 shows that the response
of other European current account balances is very heterogeneous. We report
the corresponding 90% as well as 68% error bands in Figure 9. The Figure
unveils significant deteriorations in Greece and the Netherlands, but significantly
positive responses in Spain, Finland and France. The responses of the Austrian,
Italian and Portuguese current accounts are insignificant.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to a wage moderation shock for the 1,000 accepted
rotation matrices for Germany (in %). Fry and Pagan (2007) median target
responses are colored red.
5.2 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
We now present the forecast error variances (FEV) of European current account
balances explained by German wage moderation shocks. This measures the im-
portance of these shocks to explain the variability of current accounts. As stated
earlier, German shocks are orthogonal, whereas foreign shocks are weakly corre-
lated. Therefore, we rely on Generalized FEV decompositions and focus on the
ranking of explained shares.16
Table 8 presents the FEV decomposition for the wage moderation shock using
the median target model and for different horizons. Not surprisingly, the Ger-
man shock explains more of the domestic current account balance forecast error
variance on impact. For the other EMU countries, only for France and Italy we
16With sign restrictions, it is important that the restricted shock contributes substantially
to explain the forecast error variance of the variables entering the VAR. This is the case in our
GVAR. On impact, the wage moderation shock explains, for instance, 35%, 14% and 18% of the
forecast error variance of German unemployment, real exchange rate, and output respectively.
These contributions increase for the 1 year FEV horizon.
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Figure 8: Median responses of European current account balances to a German
wage moderation shock (in %)
























Figure 9: Confidence intervals for European current account balances (in %)
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observe a relatively important effect of these shocks but only after 5 years. The
general picture, however, is that the German wage moderation shock explains a
much smaller fraction of the forecast error of the current account for other EMU
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Table 8: Forecast error variance of current account balances explained by a
German wage moderation shock
Country Impact Year 1 Year 5
aut 0.01 0.03 0.05
deu 0.06 0.12 0.13
esp 0.01 0.02 0.08
fin 0.01 0.04 0.06
fra 0.02 0.08 0.11
gre 0.00 0.04 0.05
ita 0.01 0.03 0.06
nld 0.01 0.02 0.05
prt 0.01 0.02 0.05
countries indicating that the shock is not a very important driver of European
current account balances.
6 Counterfactual analysis
The next step in our analysis is to quantify the contribution of the German labor
market shock to the levels of both the German and other EMU countries’ current
accounts. To do so, we perform a counterfactual analysis where we set the Ger-
man wage moderation innovations to zero. As the GVAR methodology explicitly
allows for international linkages, we are able to trace the effects of changing the
errors of domestic or foreign equations on the evolution of specific variables. This
can be achieved by choosing a specific base point (B) in our sample from which
we forecast B + 1, B + 2, ..., B + h conditional on the information available until
(B). It is important to note that B + h is part of the sample.
By adding the contributions of all (known) future shocks to the forecast for
every point in time (B + 1, B + 2, ..., B + h), we automatically recreate the
dataset. However, if we assume that the errors of a specific equation (j) are
zero and remove their contribution from the base projection for every point in
time, we obtain a counterfactual time series showing what would have happened
if that specific shock is canceled out.




φiǫB+h−i + φhyB, (74)
where φi denotes the i-th moving average parameter as shown by Lu¨tkepohl
(2005).
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Plugging the manipulated innovations back to the model provides us with
new data representing a world without German wage moderation shocks. For this
exercise, we use the model corresponding to the Fry and Pagan (2007) median
target. To derive the counterfactual current account balance, we proceed as
follows. To obtain a dataset excluding negative German bargaining power shocks
from time B onwards, we keep the (known) future errors of all equations and
set the (structural) wage moderation shocks in ǫt to zero. Then we perform a
h-step ahead forecast starting at time B for all k endogenous variables in our
system. Finally, we compute the contributions of the known errors for every
observation from B to B + h and add them to the base projection. Given the
actual data and the counterfactual series, we may draw conclusions about the
historical importance of the bargaining power shock.
Figure 10: Original and counterfactual data of the German CA/GDP ratio
(1992Q3-2007Q2, in %)











Figure 10 displays both, the original data and the counterfactual data of the
German current account as ratio of GDP. We observe that both series move very
close to each other. Only during the early and mid-2000s, the German current
account balance would have been lower, if wage moderation shocks were absent.
But during 2003 and 2004 the current account balance would have actually been
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higher. In general, the effect of the shock on the current account balance is very
small.
We also compute the contribution of the shock to the dispersion of current
account balances for all the countries. We calculate the sum of the absolute





for i = 1, . . . , N and N = 9. We then compute ADt for the counterfactual
current account series setting the German wage moderation shocks to zero and
compare both series.
Figure 11: Original and counterfactual dispersion of all CA/GDP ratios (1992Q3-
2007Q2, in %)










Figure 11 shows that the absolute deviation increases substantially over the
whole sample period, which is a measure of the well known increase in European
external imbalances. While the total absolute deviation of current account to
GDP ratios was only approximately 10% in 1993, it reached almost 60% in
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2006. The difference between the original and counterfactual series, however,
indicates that the identified German wage moderation shocks play a very minor
role for European Imbalances. The maximum difference between the original and
counterfactual series is approximately 3.2% in 2002. Between the years 2000 and
2003 and 2005 and 2007, the divergence would have been slightly lower without
these shocks. However, this difference is quantitatively small.
7 Conclusion
A popular explanation of the increase in the dispersion of current account po-
sitions in the Eurozone states that they originate from gains in German com-
petitiveness resulting from labor market reforms during the late 1990s and early
2000s. Two crucial elements of these reforms were the reduction in wage setting
bargaining power of unions (and union coverage) and an increase in the efficiency
of labor market matching, which we label jointly as “wage moderation” policies.
We analyze quantitatively the effect of shocks to wage moderation in Germany
on the current account positions of 9 Eurozone countries.
We develop a 3-country open economy New Keynesian DSGE model of Ger-
many, the rest of the Euro Area (REA), and the rest of the World. The model
displays search and matching frictions for Germany and the REA and shocks
to matching efficiency and wage bargaining power of workers. From the model,
we derive sign restrictions to identify a wage moderation shock. The shock ro-
bustly reduces wages, inflation, and unemployment and increases output. We
then impose these sign restrictions to identify German wage moderation shocks
in a Global VAR (GVAR) including Germany and 8 other EMU countries. The
GVAR allows us to trace the shock spillovers originating in Germany on the rest
of the countries within the system. This method is more model-agnostic and
imposes less structure on the data than estimated DSGE models.
The results from the estimated GVAR show that German wage moderation
shocks were important drivers of output, unemployment, wages, and the current
account in Germany. After a shock that either reduces the bargaining power of
unions or increases matching efficiency, the German current account improves
significantly. However, the effect of the shock on other European economies is
very small. Responses to the shock are generally heterogeneous and the impor-
tance of the shock to explain the variance of current account positions in EMU
countries is very limited. Counterfactual analysis indicates that, had these shocks
been absent, the dispersion of current account positions would have looked very
similar to what it was. Consequently, the wage moderation resulting from the
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We test every series for seasonality using the testing procedure outlined in Smith
and Galesi (2011) and adjust all series with a seasonal component by employing
the X12-ARIMA method. We allow the software to correct for additive outliers.
All series are obtained in quarterly frequency. Exceptions are explicitly men-
tioned in this section. When necessary, we interpolate data using the Boots,
Feibes, and Lisman (1967) methodology.
• Real GDP
We employ real GDP series from the OECD (Ecowin: oe:(country code) gdpvq).
• CPI/Inflation
All CPI series are obtained from the OECD database (Ecowin: oecd:(country
code) cpaltt01 ixobq).
• Real Wage
We use compensation of employees data (Ecowin: oe:aut wsssq) and the to-
tal number of employees data (Ecowin: oecd:(country code) emeytths stsaq)
from the OECD database to compute the compensation per employee.
Exceptions are compensation series for Greece, Netherlands and Portugal
(Ecowin: oe:(country code) wsssa) as well as number of employees data for
Greece and the Netherlands (ana:(country code) eem per) where we extend
the quarterly series with interpolated annual data. We deflate these series
with the CPI to get a measure of real wages.
• Unemployment Rate
Unemployment rate data (Ecowin: oecd:(country code) unrtsutt stsaq)
comes from the OECD database. We complete the Greek series with inter-
polated annual data (Ecowin: oecd:(country code) unrtsutt stsaa).
• REER
We use the real effective exchange rate series from the IMF IFS database.
(Ecowin: ifs:s(country code)00reczfq)
• Current Account Balance
We use the current account balance from the OECD online database and
the nominal GDP (Ecowin: oe:(country code) gdpq) from the OECD database
(Ecowin) to construct the current account balance to GDP ratio.
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• Interest Rate
The source for the German nominal short-term interest rate (money market
rate) is the IMF IFS database (Ecowin: ifs:s(country code)60b00zfq).
• Trade Data
We use the Directions of Trade statistics from the IMF in annual frequency
to compute the trade weight matrix.
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B Solution of the bargaining problem
B.1 Wages













+ (1− ηkt ) lnµ
k
t . (B2)



































First order conditions with respect to W kt and H
k

































































































As the sharing rule must also hold in the future, we get
ηkt+1µ
k

























































































































































































































which differs from the one obtained by Krause, Lopez-Salido, and Lubik
(2008), because hours do in our open economy model depend on χkt .
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C Steady State
We assume that in steady state π = 1, pi∗ = 1, B = 0, e = 1, q = 1 and Cw = C.










M = m¯SνV 1−ν (C5)
S = 1− (1− ρ)N (C6)
N = (1− ρ)N +M (C7)







(1− ρ) + mcνN (ν−1)Hν −WH (C10)














H = (mcυ2N (υ−1)λ)(1/(1+ϕ−υ)) (C13)
Y = C + κV (C14)
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D IRFs in the DSGE model with parameter un-
certainty
Figure 12: Technology shock under parameter uncertainty (pre-EMU model)





















































Note: The shaded area denotes the 10% to 90% range of impulse re-
sponses for the 10,000 draws.
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Figure 13: Technology shock under parameter uncertainty (EMU model)

















































Note: The shaded area denotes the 10% to 90% range of impulse re-
sponses for the 10,000 draws.
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Figure 14: Preference shock under parameter uncertainty (pre-EMU model)


















































Note: The shaded area denotes the 10% to 90% range of impulse re-
sponses for the 10,000 draws.
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Figure 15: Preference shock under parameter uncertainty (EMU model)















































Note: The shaded area denotes the 10% to 90% range of impulse re-
sponses for the 10,000 draws.
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Figure 16: Monetary policy shock under parameter uncertainty (pre-EMU
model)
















































Note: The shaded area denotes the 10% to 90% range of impulse re-
sponses for the 10,000 draws.
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Figure 17: Monetary policy shock under parameter uncertainty (EMU model)














































Note: The shaded area denotes the 10% to 90% range of impulse re-
sponses for the 10,000 draws.
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Figure 18: Labor supply shock under parameter uncertainty (pre-EMU model)

















































Note: The shaded area denotes the 10% to 90% range of impulse re-
sponses for the 10,000 draws.
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Figure 19: Labor supply shock under parameter uncertainty (EMU model)

















































Note: The shaded area denotes the 10% to 90% range of impulse re-
sponses for the 10,000 draws.
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Figure 20: Persistent shock to bargaining power under parameter uncertainty
(pre-EMU model, ρη = 0.99)
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Note: The shaded area denotes the 10% to 90% range of impulse re-
sponses for the 10,000 draws.
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Figure 21: Persistent shock to matching efficiency under parameter uncertainty
(pre-EMU model, ρm = 0.99)




















































Note: The shaded area denotes the 10% to 90% range of impulse re-
sponses for the 10,000 draws.
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Figure 22: Persistent shock to bargaining power under parameter uncertainty
(EMU model, ρη = 0.99)
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Note: The shaded area denotes the 10% to 90% range of impulse re-
sponses for the 10,000 draws.
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Figure 23: Persistent shock to matching efficiency under parameter uncertainty
(EMU model, ρm = 0.99)

















































Note: The shaded area denotes the 10% to 90% range of impulse re-
sponses for the 10,000 draws.
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